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The laws dealing with estates and trusts are a form of commun-
ity control over the use of wealth. A person who produces or
possesses wealth has power to enhance or diminish the security
of others. Because of the power wealth carries with it, some
form of control by a community over the use of wealth is vital
to the welfare of all its members. While facts existing at a
particular time and place determine the ends which a commun-
ity seeks through control of wealth and the techniques of control
it applies, these facts always include the experience gained by
the community from past efforts to control wealth processes.
There must be a constant redefinition of the ends of control in
the light of community experience. Existing techniques of con-
trol must be appraised and modified and new techniques must
be invented to attain the ends as redefined.
Richie, Alford & Effland,
Decedents' Estates and Trusts 7 (3d ed. 1967)
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But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering
the true meaning of a law . . . is by considering the reason and
spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.
For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to
cease with it.
Blackstone, Commentaries, Book I, at 61 (1765)
One of the less publicized gambits of the Arkansas General
Assembly of 1969 was to pass House Bill 448, "An Act to Amend
the Inheritance Laws of the State of Arkansas," which was
signed by the Governor and became Act 303 of 1969. While the
goodhearted, latter-day Puritans and part-time clerics worried
about the deleterious effects which a local option mixed-drink
bill might sow among an otherwise spiritually inclined citizenry,
while the Governor brooded about the need for greater tax reve-
nues and the legislature pondered how much they could produce
without offending a tax-conscious electorate, and while a con-
vention to chart a new organic course for the State 'waited
quietly in the wings, one of the least noticed and less contro-
versial bills to glide through the legislative gauntlet was this
act altering a number of salient aspects of Arkansas property
law with particular reference to the law of descent and distribu-
tion. When clerics have long since become acclimated to the
spectacle of people sampling the quality of the martinis served
at the Little Rock Embers, when Arkansas has either solved its
tax problems or has promoted all of its colleges to the rank of
"university" to more effectively disguise their inadequacies, the
effect of these new inheritance provisions will still be felt. This
is not to say that the changes made are all that sweeping; but
simply that they are important, and that they will ultimately
touch the lives of all Arkansans, who like other mortals must
live and die and who, to whatever degree they observed the laws
of society during life, will most certainly die by them.
These new inheritance provisions were the product of a
committee' of the Arkansas Bar Association, but the truth of the
matter is that the bulk of the thinking and the vast majority of
the wording came from the mind and pen of Harry E. Meek, who
1. The members of the committee were Owen C. Pearce, Chair-
man; Harry E. Meek, Honorary Chairman; Frank C. Bridges, Jr.;
Chancellor Thomas F. Butt; Oliver Clegg; Ben Core; Julian Fogleman;
Richard B. McCulloch; Duval L. Purkins; Chancellor Murray Reed;
Charles B. Roscopf; Leonard L. Scott; James B. Sharp, H. Franklin
Waters; Chancellor Royce Weisenberger; and the author.
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most lawyers would concede has a greater grasp of the Arkansas
law of property, its oddities and quirks and pitfalls and dark
alleys, than any other living man. The legal profession in Ar-
kansas owes a lasting debt to the genius and-wit of Harry Meek,
and whatever limited critical commentary may be developed in
this article should never detract from that fact. Mr. Meek has
made so many contributions to the law of Arkansas. that his
service to the Bar, and through its auspices to the public in gen-
eral, has made up for the lesser efforts of many of us. He is a
lawyer's lawyer in every sense of the phrase. Similar credit
should be paid to the committee chairman, Owen C. Pearce, who
kept after the committee to get the job done.
One more prefatory observation is also relevant. The com-
mittee dealt in terms of political realities, with what it thought
the legislature and the Bar would be willing to buy at this
time and in this draft. Also, the committee was fighting a time
limitation. It was never the thought that what was accom-
plished was the "be all" and "end all" in terms of the total pic-
ture. The committee's work is not finished. What some of us
would have liked to have done, however, we felt we could not do
or did not have time to do at this juncture. It may be well to
summarize at the beginning some of the general impressions
that can be derived from the new inheritance provisions before
venturing into the swampland of specifics:
1. One of the better things the new provisions accomplished
was to clarify much of what previously had been confusing,
uncertain and had provided grist for the mill of faculty and
student writers of countless law review generations.
2. Another major benefit accomplished by the new provisions
was to abolish, with a limited exception, ancestral estates,
which by this time had almost become an institution limited
to Arkansas.
3. A major change, which will likely be much debated, was to
elevate the surviving spouse to the position of an heir of
the intestate deceased, and in a way which is somewhat
peculiar to this jurisdiction.
4. A substantial change, though less important in reality than
in theory, was to limit heirship, whereas previously in Ar-
kansas, heirship had been unlimited.
5. Other important changes involved the correction of some
ambiguities or improprieties in existing law in the hope of
bringing it more in accord with modern tendencies.
With .this out of the way, we can turn to some of the spe-
cifics which the Act accomplished.
1969]
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I. CHINKING UP SOME HOLES
A. The Historical Predicate
The modern tendency, which is manifested in the Uni-
form Probate Code adopted by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, is to eliminate the distinction
between real and personal property. The reason is quite simple:
times have changed. After the Normans had conquered the
Saxons at Hastings in 1066, led by William the Bastard, the son
of Robert the Devil,2 and the Saxon lands had passed in large
measure to the King and had been parceled out to Norman no-
bles,3 the feudal system and the tenurial concept flowered like a
rare black rose.4 Like all roses, whatever their color, it gradu-
ally withered and died, but its characteristics and its product
lived on to control and haunt generations to come. They were
bound by its precepts, and the thoughts and conditions and rules
of dead men controlled the lives and property of men who lived
and withered and joined them in the cemetery. Generations and
2. W. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND LEGACY 4 (1965),
refers to William the Conqueror's less well-known appellation, pointing
out that he was the "illegitimate son of Duke Robert 'the Devil'."
Robert was also known as "the Magnificent," which possibly served to
balance things a bit.
3. Id. at 7: "And so Harold had died, and with him the Saxon
civilization. For William understood, as he turned inland from the
battlefield, that there could be no half measures if his reign was to be
made secure; the whole of England must be infiltrated and the
Saxon power destroyed forever. The English had hazarded everything
at Hastings, and they had lost everything; now earldoms which had been
established only a few generations after the last Romans had departed
from Britain, and had survived and absorbed Danish and other Scandi-
navian adventurers, were to be supplanted by Norman baronies. * * *
The England into which William advanced was the product of a thou-
sand years of sporadic invasions; he intended that his would be the
last."
Some Saxon lords were permitted to redeem their lands in whole
or in part. "But by far the greater portion of the English estates were
appropriated by the Norman Conqueror and went to his followers. ...
But the central fact was that the grants themselves came from the
crown .... William, as king, was now an annointed sovereign, and all
men were henceforth his tenants, holding their estates of him." Id.
at 11.
4. "With this absolute control of land, the essential commodity,
William could give full effect to the moral, personal, and military
commitments embodied in the ritual of homage. This binding cere-
mony was well established by the Conqueror's day and epitomized the
mystique of the feudal age. * * * This intricately stratified organiza-
tion of tenancy affected only the upper fraction of Norman England; but
the feudal law prescribed the duties of the humble as well as the privi-
leged. * * * For the average man, these duties were elaborately de-
tailed and rigidly enforced." Id. at 11-13.
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centuries passed. Sir Edward Coke,5 a strange contradiction who
could both fight for the principal "modern" precepts of Magna
Carta6 and deliver the classic exposition of the common law of
the remote English past,' manifested an impact which carried
over into Blackstone's Commentaries and through Blackstone
into America.8 Thus did we acquire the English land law as it
existed in the seventeenth century, and what we did not inherit
in this fashion, we made certain we acquired through reception
5. Coke was Solicitor General and later Attorney General to
Queen Elizabeth I, and served as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and
Chief Justice of the King's Bench under King James I. See 3 R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 428 (1959). Between his service as Solicitor
General and Attorney General, he served also as Speaker of the House
of Commons. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONcIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 242 (1956).
6. As Professor Swindler observes, "Sir Edward had undergone
a revelation, upon his elevation to the chief justiceship of the Common
Pleas, as Thomas 6 Becket had experienced when he had been conse-
crated Archbishop. Both men had been, prior to this transfiguration,
vigorous supporters of a dominating monarchy; both had then had a
complete change in the perspective with which they viewed the royal
prerogatives." SWINDLER, supra note 2, at 172. King James ultimately
dismissed Coke from office for failing to obey his will in a case in-
volving the Bishop of Coventry. As time passed, and as the issue grew
between the King and Parliament of whether the King or the law was
supreme in England, Coke, by then in his seventies, led the fight
against the King that culminated in the passage of the Petition of Right.
At possibly the high point of the debate, Coke uttered the famous
words: "I know that prerogative is part of the law, but sovereign power
is no Parliamentary word; in my opinion, it weakens Magna Carta and
all our statutes; for they are absolute without any saving of sovereign
power. And shall we now add to it, we shall weaken the foundation of
Law, and then the building must needs fall; take we heed what we yield
unto-Magna Carta is such a Fellow, he will have no Sovereign." (As
quoted in SWINDLER, supra note 2 at 185).
7. See 5 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 423-493 (2d
ed. 1937). Pound stated that Coke's Institutes were "books of authority
wherever the common law obtains." 3 POUND, supra note 5. Plucknett
observed that Coke "established his reputation by sheer weight of
learning," and that his influence was such that it "made for the estab-
lishment of a supreme common law." PLUCKNETT, supra note 5 at 282,
284. Professor Radin viewed Coke's statements as "a point of de-
parture for the Common Law from the seventeenth century on." M.
RADIN, ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 266 (1936). Coke's outlook
was often more medieval than modern, but "the sum total of his presence
was to elevate the common law to a status which it never had before;
to systematize it and yet constrict it; and at the same time to form the
philosophical bridge from the middle ages to the modern era." R.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 33 (1968).
8. Pound states: "Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765-1769) was much used in America .... and
was accepted by the courts after the Revolution as a statement of the
law which we received." See 3 POUND, supra note 5. Of course, Black-
stone relied heavily upon Coke.
19691
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statutes.9 By the nineteenth century, land law in Britain was
changing by leaps and bounds,10 but many American jurisdic-
tions remained more English than England.1 This was partic-
ularly true in the South with its plantation economy, tied as it
was to land as a primary means of wealth. We brought Sir
Walter Scott to America with us, and we gave him a Southern
accent and enshrined his chivalry and the system of his time
as our own. But it was not purely a Southern phenomenon.
Early America was a society in which there was a scarcity of
fluid capital, in which there was no credit-oriented economy in
the sense that we know it today. Taxation had not yet developed
as it ultimately would. The federal government had one prime
resource-western land ceded to it by the original thirteen states
-and it "spent" this resource to create capital and credit where
there was none, to open a wilderness to cultivation, to build a
transportation industry based on the steam locomotive, to over-
come a scarcity of labor and capital in society.12 Small wonder
that in the early days of America, land was of prime significance
among the assets a man might accumulate. But along toward
the end of the nineteenth century, we turned the corner; we
ultimately overcame economic scarcity; we underwent an indus-
trial revolution and began a growth toward an urban society;
we developed taxation and credit and with them a multiplicity
of economic options. The modern corporation began to develop
9. In Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-101 (1956 Repl.). See also
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.010 (Supp. 1968) and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1 (1969).
10. E.g., the Fines and Recoveries Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74
(1833), provided a method of disentailing an estate in fee tail by per-
mitting the tenant in tail to convey an estate in fee simple if he had
present possession. The Doctrine of Worthier Title was also abolished
in England in 1833. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 1612 (2d ed. 1956), citing 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, § 3. (1833); but compare,
Comment, The Doctrine of Worthier Title in Arkansas, 21 ARK. L. REV.
394, 406-407, fn. 88 (1967). The rule on the destructibility of contingent
remainders was abolished as it applied to premature termination of the
supporting life estate in the Real Property Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106,
§ 8 (1845), and as it applied to those remainders which failed to vestl
upon natural termination of the life estate in the Contingent Remain-
ders Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., c. 33, § 1 (1877). See Fetters, De-
structibility of Contingent Remainders, 21 ARK. L. REV. 145, 149 (1967).
The British retained the Rule in Shelley's Case until 1925, when it
was abolished in the Property Act of that year, 15 Geo. V., c. 20, § 131
(1925).
11. E.g., Arkansas. See Wright, Medieval Law in the Age of Space:
Some "Rmles of Property" in Arkansas, 22 ARK. L. REV. 248 (1968).
12. On this subject generally, see W. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROC-
ESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1960).
[Vol. 23:313
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and proliferate. Henry Ford and mass production came along.
Suddenly, land was no longer the. prime economic asset. It
might be equaled or surpassed in value by printed pieces of pa-
per in the form of stock certificates or negotiable instruments or
bank certificates representing gold or silver. Times had
changed, but the property laws by and large had not.
But now they have in large measure. Now we know-and
the Arkansas Probate Code has recognized 3 -that for all its last-
ing value, land might in some circumstances be a lesser article
of value. Both delta and hill land (excepting that in Conway
County, Arkansas, 4 of course) might be of lesser value than a
handful of stock certificates. It may be said that this is the
product of an essentially urban society; but the fact of the matter
-is that it is the product of an essentially modern, credit-oriented
economy, whether urban or rural. In this situation the distinc-
tions between real and personal property, particularly in the
probate or inheritance context, become more artificial and less
realistic.
B. Definition of "Heirs"
In keeping with this fact of modern life, the new inheritance
provisions speak in terms of "heirs" or an "heir."1 5 Mr. Meek's
comment was that it might seem "illogical" to apply the designa-
tion to those inheriting personalty, but he found it a "conven-
ience of draftmanship."'" The death of the distinction is over-
due, because the reason for it no longer prevails. In the most
13. Under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2401 (Supp. 1967), real prop-
erty is an asset in the hands of the personal representative if the will
directs or if "the court finds that such property should be sold, mort-
gaged, leased or exchanged for any purpose enumerated ... irrespective
of whether personal property of the estate (other than money) is avail-
able for such purpose." Especially noteworthy in this respect is the
preamble to ARK. ACTS 1961, No. 424, which stated: "Whereas, due to
the changed nature of the economy of Arkansas, it is no longer true
that real property constitutes the sound core of the assets of most es-
tates; and in many instances the estate of a decedent now includes
investments represented by personal property more desirable than cer-
tain types of real property to be preserved for distribution . . ." and
so on.
14. See Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Hawkins, 246 Ark.
55, 437 S.W.2d 463 (1969), and read the dissent of Justice George Rose
Smith.
15. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 1.
16. It was also pointed out in the comment to section one that
no prefatory section of this type is found in the present laws. For the
time of vesting of both realty and personalty in the heirs, see Dean v.
Brown, 216 Ark. 761, 227 S.W.2d 623 (1950), cited by Mr. Meek.
1969]
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recent draft of the Uniform Probate Code, "property" is defined
as "both real and personal property and means anything that
may be the subject of ownership" and thereafter, no distinction
is made.17 Moreover, it is observed: "It is no longer meaningful
to have different patterns for real and personal property, and
under the proposed statute all property not disposed of by a
decedent's will passes to his heirs in the same manner."' 8 Thus,
if anything, the new provisions on "heirs" remains behind the
trend although true to current law in that real estate "passes im-
mediately to the heirs" of the intestate subject to the personal
representative's right to sell it for payment of debts, while per-
sonalty passes to the personal representative. 19
C. "Descendants" and "Dying Intestate"
Section two of the new Act defines "dying intestate, '20 al-
though it adds nothing of substance except that the present stat-
ute does not define it. Similarly, section three defines "descend-
ants" as those in a direct line of lineal descent from the intes-
tate,2 this being done for the reason that (a) some courts did
not know what the word meant: (b) the committee wanted to
make it clear that the term included adopted children; and (c)
it was deemed desirable also to state that the "descendants" of a
living descendant could not take.2 2 Much or even all of this
section, it might be argued, was not necessary, except for the re-
mote possibility that an Arkansas court, during a momentary
lapse of judgment, might misinterpret the law or render an un-
fortunate decision. That this thought might perish, the section
was included.
17. UNIFOmI PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 1-201 (aa)
(1969).
18. Id. at 22 (General comment to Art. II, part 1).
19. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 1. See also, ARK. STAT. ANN. §
62-2401 (Supp. 1967) with which this provision is consistent.
20. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 2.
21. Id. at § 3.
22. With regard to the first reason, the term had been used to refer
to property "descending" to collaterals or to refer to inheriting collaterals
as "descendants." This is noted in the comment, which cites no Ar-
kansas cases in this regard, but cites C.J.S. and an Ohio case. The
definition of "descendants" in the Act specifically excludes "an Intes-
tate's ascendants or collateral relatives" and specifically includes
"adopted children (and their descendants) of the Intestate." In part
(b) of the section, it is stated that the descendants of a living de-
scendant "shall be excluded from the class," this being seemingly obvi-
ous but set forth due to the desire of the committee "to make it em-
phatic" that an intestate's grandchild cannot inherit while the intestate's
child (the parent of the grandchild) is still living. (From committee
comment to § 3).
[Vol. 23:313
ARKANSAS INHERITANCE LAWS
D. "Per Capita" and "Per Stirpes"
In dealing in sections four and five with the terms, "per
capita" and "per stirpes," it was the aim of the committee to clar-
ify existing law and to make the meaning and application of
these terms readily discernible. These terms had not been pre-
viously defined by statute in Arkansas, 23 although judicial defi-
nitions and interpretations had been developed.24 Section four
of the new inheritance provisions states that if all the members
of the class who inherit property from an intestate "are related
to the Intestate in equal degree, they will inherit the Intestate's
estate in equal shares, and will be said to take per capita.
'25
Having said this, the committee had probably said enough. But
it was desired to leave no doubt about the matter, and for this
reason the unusual drafting approach was adopted of providing
an example of the rule within the statute itself: "For illustra-
tion, if the Intestate leaves no heirs except children, the children
will take per capita and in equal shares; if he leaves no heirs
except grandchildren all the grandchildren will take per capita
and in equal shares; if the inheriting class consists solely of great
grandchildren, or any more remote descendants of the Intestate
who are all related to him in the same degree, they will take
per capita.'26  The same rule was applied by the statute to in-
heritance by collateral heirs of the intestate, and this too was
illustrated in detail. It was also stated that if the inheriting
class consisted of uncles, aunts and grandparents (all of whom
constitute a class under the descent provisions), they would take
per capita. In the committee comment written by Mr. Meek,
the reason for spelling this out so thoroughly was revealed:
Suppose the Intestate had only two children, both of whom
23. However, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-108, 61-109 (1947) had made
provision in the per stirpes situation as to descendants, it being stated
in the former statute that if some children of an intestate be living and
;some be dead, "the inheritance shall descend to the children who are
living and the descendants of such children as shall have died . . .so
that the descendants of each child who shall be dead shall inherit the
same their parent would have received if living." The latter statute
provided that this rule of descent would apply in all cases where the
"descendants of the intestate, entitled to share .. .shall be in equal
degrees of consanguinity. . . ." Although these old statutes referred to
descendants of the intestate, the same principles were applied to col-
laterals in Daniels v. Johnson, 216 Ark. 374, 226 S.W.2d 571, 15 A.L.R.2d
1402 (1950).
24. See the old landmark case of Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15
Ark. 555 (1855), and Daniels v. Johnson, supra note 23.
25. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 4(a).
26. Id.
1969]
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predeceased him: One of these children (child "A") left nine
children, the other (child "B") left one child. In this situation,
the Intestate's ten grandchildren are all related to him in the
same degree and will take per capita-each child taking a one-
tenth interest. In the past there has been some confusion of
opinion on this point; and some attorneys have assumed that
nine children of child "A" would take collectively a one-half in-
terest, and the one child of child "B" would take a full half
interest. This conclusion would not be correct. All the grand-
children being related to the Intestate in the same degree, they
take per capita, and in their own right, and not per stirpes, or
through the right of representation. See Blackstone's Commen-
taries, Book II, Page 218; Garrett v. Bean, 51 Ark. 52, 9 S.W. 435.
In other words, each of the ten children would take a one-
tenth part in the assumed situation.27
The (b) part of section four provided that if the heirs were re-
lated to the intestate in unequal degree, the ones in the nearer
degree would take per capita while those in the more remote
degree would take per stirpes.28  Related to this is section five
providing that heirs will take per stirpes in several situations.
One is where the intestate is predeceased by a person or persons
who would have inherited if they had survived and who leave
descendants surviving the intestate. Here, the estate is divided
into as many equal shares as there are surviving heirs in the
nearest degree of kinship and persons in the same degree of kin-
ship who predeceased the intestate leaving descendants. The
descendants of the predeceased persons collectively receive the
share of their ancestor. Thus, these descendants take per stirpes
while the surviving heirs in the nearest degree to the intestate
take per capita. It is as if the predeceased persons having de-
scendants had not died at all and had shared per capita, in
equal parts, with the surviving heirs of the nearest degree, but
then had themselves died intestate immediately following and
thus passed on their shares to their respective descendants. As
for the descendants of the predeceased person, they take his
share in equal parts if they are all related in the same degree.
But what if some of them are children and some are the issue
of deceased children? Then again, the same rule is applied, and
the accrued share passes per capita to those in the nearer degree,
and per stirpes to those of the more remote relationship. Why
is this spelled out in such detail? Mr. Meek observes in the
comment that it is "rather careless" simply to say that the de-
scendants will take the share their deceased parent would have
taken because of the problem of successive per stirpes situations.
27. Committee comment to ARK. AcTS 1969, § 4.
28. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 4(b).
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The answer then is that "in each generation if necessary," the
same general formula is applied.2  As the Act states, "if the de-
scendants of a predeceased person be found in multiple genera-
tions, the above formula for division shall be applied in respect
to the descendants in each generation."3 0
These provisions apply to both real and personal property
and to both lineal and collateral heirs. Moreover, if the inherit-
ing class consist of grandparents, uncles and aunts, it applies to
the descendants of predeceased uncles or aunts, although not to
the descendants of predeceased grandparents. The same is true
of great grandparents, great uncles and great aunts."
The sum total of these provisions is to eliminate some of the
difficulties and inequities which have occurred in other courts.
For example, in a California case, Maud v. Catherwood,32 the
heirs were surviving grandchildren and great-grandchildren.
The court ruled that because the survivors were not. of equal
degrees, they all took by representation. To take per capita, they
all had to be related in the same degree. When traced to the
common ancestors of equal degrees (the deceased children), the
result was that three of the grandchildren and one great-grand-
child received one-eighth, while one grandchild and one great-
grandchild received one-fourth. This followed a California stat-
ute stating that if all of the descendants were in the same degree
of kindred, they would share equally, but otherwise they took by
representation. The Arkansas provisions obviously, avoid such
a result.33
29. Committee comment to No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 5. Quite
obviously, this statute is detailed in comparison to the older statutes
cited in note 23, supra, -and seeks to tie up all the loose ends which
might previously have existed.
30. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 5(b).
31. Id. at § 5(c). The Act goes into extensive, seemingly needless,
detail on this point. However, as the comment states: "It is felt that
the statute should spell out the extent to which the per stirpes rule ap-
plies where the inheriting class consists of grandparents, uncles and
aunts, or great grandparents, great uncles and great aunts, because
these are situations where persons in different generations inherit as
coheirs. Our present statute (Section 61-101) uses the words 'grand-
father, grandmother, uncles and aunts and their descendants in equal
parts'; but it seems that under this present statute the 'descendants' are
admitted to the inheritance only when they take per stirpes. Scull v.
Vaugine, 15 Ark. 695; Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555."
32. 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111 (1945), noted in 33 CAL. L.
REv. 324 (1945).
33. Under § 5(a) of the Arkansas.Act, the heirs in Maud v. Cather-
wood would have each received one-sixth.
1969J
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'E. Transmissible .Interests
Section seven :of the Act is designed to eliminate much of
the doubt that has built up as -to -the interests which -may pass
by inheritance and those which may not. Ben Core plunged into
this milieu in a 1951 ,article in the Arkansas Law -Review.'4  On
the subject of possibilities of reverter .(which passed to the heirs
at the common law),3 1 he tobserved that in Fletcher v. Ferrill ,"
the Arkansas Court stated it took no position on whether a pos-
sibility of 'reverter passed to the heirs under the statute -of -de-
scent.17 He noted, however, that previous Arkansas cases "are
strongly indicative that these interests have been doing that very
thing for a number rof -years ' '3  In Davis v. Davis," -a 1951 case,
the Arkansas Court ruled that a -reversionary interest could -pass
by inheritance, citing the article 'by Mr. Core -as -authority for the
proposition. This case, however, ,involved a reversion, not .a -pos-
sibility of -reverter -(which is a characteristic only 'of .a -deter-
minable fee) .4o 'The majority o9pinion observed that in an -earlier
case, LeSieur v. Spikes,41 -the court :had "inadvertently remarked
that such .an interest is a possibility of reverter '(instead 'of .a re-
version) :and that it 'is not -disposable. '42 Prior to this, the ,court
on rehearing in -Fletcher v. Ferrill4" had distinguished LeSieur
on -the basis that in Fletcher it had held that a possibil]ity of re-
verter may Ibe -devised, whereas 'in LeSie.ur a .will 'as 'not in-
volved. Also, "the statement was merely dictum" in LeSieur be-
cause "Dixie LeSieur in fact was survived by heirs of her 'body
and therefore it was :unnecessary to decide ,Whether a ,possibility
of: reverter .can !be 'transferred by deed :"4 In H.utchison v. Shep-
S34. 'Core, Transmnissibility -o Certain Contingent Fture Interests,
5 ARK. L. -REv. '111 (1951).
35. See 23 Am. Jun. 2d, Descent and Distribution, § '33 .(1965),;
RESTATEmENT,'PROPERTY § 164,.comments (a) and (c) (1936).
36. 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 449 '(1950-).
37. Core, supra ;note '34, at 116. (The Arkansas court -said, ,how-
ever, that a possibility ,of reverter was-subject 'to devise..)
38. Id.
39. '219 Ark. .623/243 S*W.2d '739 :(1951).
40. 'It also 'remains in the grantor of an -estate -in fee simple condi-
tional in those few :states which still recognize such an estate. See
23 Am. Jur. '2d 21, Descent and 'Distribution, § 33 ('1965). Arkansas, of
course, does not !have -the fee simple conditional, 'and so in Arkansas
the possibility 'of -reverter -remains only in 'the grantor of a fee simple
determinable.
41. -117 Ark. 366, 175 S.W_. 413 (1915). 'See also 'Fetters, ,supra note
10, at 154-155.
42. '219 Ark. :623, 625, 243 -S.W.2d *739 (1951).
43. 216 Ark. 583, 591, 227 'S.W.2d 449, 453 (1950).
44. Id.
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pard,45 a -few years after -the Davis case, the court again stated
that a "divestable reversion" may 'be 'transferred :by deed -or by
will and -is a :subject of inheritance upon the reversioner's death
intestate.''40  Again, 'however, this did 'not answer the question
as to -the possibility of reverter, :and the :status of the law was
dependent -only on 'the common law rule that ,a possibility of re-
verter passed to the heirs and the hunch -that the court would
follow Ben Core's article, as it had in both Davis and Hutchison.
The fact that in Fletcher the court had chosen to .state that it
took no position on the .subject 'left the matter clouded. Similar
doubt existed as to a right -of re-entry for condition broken,47
although 'the Restatement took the position -that this could pass
by inheritance 8 .(which was the :same position it adopted on the
possibility 'of reverter). In the ,case of executory interests, there
was :similar 'doubt, even though 'the courts .seemed not to doubt
that 'they were descendible once the 'validity of 'these interests
had been recogiized.49
In any 'event .section seven -puts -any -doubts to rest. It pro-
vides that "every right, 'title and interest" in both realty and
personalty 'whih the intestate!s 4death ,does not terminate may
be inherited.50 4(This 'is subject, of 'course, to testamentary dis-
45. 225 Ark. 14, 279 S.W.2d '33 (1955).
.46. .225 .Ark. 14,,21, 279 SW.2d .33 (1955).
47. The right of re-entry for condition .broken .or power of termi-
nation is retained -by the grantor in a fee simple .upon condition subse-
quent. 'The conveyance is "'upon -condition that" the event does ,not
occur. If the 'event occurs, the 'grantor must take the :initiative in -exer-
cising :his -right of re-entry or power 'of termination. On this, sec
Moore v. Sharp, '91 Ark. 407, 121 -S.W. 341 (1909).. Thus, 'the ,right 'ol
re-entry -theoretically differs 'from a .possibility of reverter in whicl .
the testate reverts automatically upon the occurrence of -the -event
Practically speaking, there 'is -probably going to be a lawsuit in eithe
event.
48. RESTATEMENT,.PRoPERTY!§ .164,'comment (a) (1936).
49. See 20 ARK. 'L. 'REv. 190 ,(1966), -citing Goodtitled Gurnall v
Wood, Willes 211, 125 Eng. Rep. '1136 (C.P. 1740).
50. It should be -generally noted, although these .sections would no
seem to call for extended discussion in the text, that section eight o.
Act 303 provides that -an intestate may transmit title by inheritanc,
even though -he is not in actual or constructive possession and evey
though someone is in adverse possession. The 'committee comment note
that under the common law, the ancestor had to be in actual or con
structive possession, but that this rule has never *been followed in Ai
kansas (citing Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, supra 'note 24, 'at .585; Am
STAT. ANN. § 50-408 (1947.); and ARK. 'STAT. ANN. §,61-101 (.1947))..
Section .nine -of the Act :provides that where real or -personal prol
erty is passed by inheritance *to two or more persons, 'they take
tenants in common (unless it involves personalty distributed in separa
units by a personal representative). This is simply a rewritten, clarifi
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position of such property, as well as to the various rights of the
surviving spouse and children and to the administration of the
estate.) So that no doubt would be left on the subject, the Act
spells it out that "the Intestate's entire right and title in respect
to any and all reversionary and remainder interests, rights of re-
entry or forfeiture for condition broken, executory interests and
possibilities of reverter, whether any of such interests be vested
or contingent, shall be transmissible by inheritance and will pass
to the Intestate's heirs determined as of the time of his death."'"
Clearly, this is in keeping with the modern trend and represents
the better rule. It gives the broadest possible rights in the heirs
with respect to both the real and personal estate of the intestate
deceased. The sweeping nature of the language leaves no doubt
that the committee intended that all types of property interests
which death does not terminate should be able to pass in ab-
sence of will by descent and distribution. The language is of
such force that it takes care of some ancillary questions which
might otherwise be raised in connection with these interests-
such as whether a power of termination (right of re-entry) is
transmissible before the condition is broken. Until or unless
the condition subsequent is broken, the right to re-enter lies
dormant; it may be said to be contingent upon the breaking of
the condition. Section seven makes all of these interests,
whether vested or contingent, subject to inheritance. It is thus
immaterial whether the condition is breached in the lifetime of
the grantor. Note, however, that these new inheritance provi-
sions apply on their face only to intestacy. They seemingly have
no bearing on the current status of the law with respect to the
transmissibility of these interests by will or inter vivos instru-
ments. This is somewhat illusory, however. It would be wholly
illogical to say that these rights and interests may be inherited
but not devised. Moreover, with respect to inter vivos convey-
ances, the Arkansas statutes provide that "all lands, tenements
and hereditaments may be aliened and possession thereof trans-
ferred by deed. '52 A "hereditament" is "whatever, upon the
death of the owner, passes, in the absence of disposition by will,i
by act of law, to the heir," and may in some jurisdictions include
version of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-115 (1947).
Section ten states that in inheritance, the male is not to be pre-
ferred over the female. The committee comment notes that although
the contrary was true under the common law canons of descent, "Act
52 of 1933 and Act 117 of 1937 removed this preference."
51. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 7.
52. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-401 (1947).
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personal property.5" The effect of section seven, therefore, is to
make all of these rights and interests subject not only to in-
heritance by the heirs of the intestate but also freely alienable
by deed, when. this section is read in conjunction with this ex-
isting statute.
By definition, the inheritability of "every right, title and in-
terest" in real or personal property must necessarily include in-
terests both legal and equitable in nature. A "right" is simply
a legally enforceable claim of one person against another with
the result that the other either is obligated to perform or not to
perform a given act.54 Moreover, as the Restatement points out,
interests "are legal or equitable." 5 Under the principle of equi-
table conversion, when a seller and purchaser enter into a legally
enforceable contract for the sale of land, the equitable title au-
tomatically passes by operation of law to the purchaser: The
purchaser is entitled to receive the legal title when the contract
is consummated, and until consummated the seller holds the
bare legal title and has the right to receive the proceeds or bal-
ance of the proceeds of the sale as well as any other obligations
the purchaser may have assumed under the contract.50 Conse-
quently, it was unnecessary to state that "every right, title and
interest" included those both legal and equitable, since one would
have to hearken all the way back to Lord Coke's antipathy for
equity (and in fact, even beyond) to attempt to reach a conclu-
sion to the contrary. 57
53. 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 10 (3d ed., Jones ed., 1939).
54. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 1 (1936).
55. Id., § 6.
56. See W. WALSH, EQUITY § 86 (1930).
57. WALSH, supra note 56, states: "On the death of the purchaser
prior to the transfer of title under the contract, his equitable estate
passes either to his devisees or devisee under his will, or to his heirs if
he dies intestate, subject to the lien of the vendor as mortgagee in equity
for payment of the purchase price, the personal representative being
required to pay the purchase money out of the personal estate of the
purchaser. * * * If the vendor dies pending performance of the contract,
whether before or after the day fixed for closing, his legal title as
trustee passes to his heirs or devisees, as the case may be, subject to the
trust in favor of the purchaser, his heirs, devisees or assigns, and the
dower right of his widow. In other words no beneficial right therein
passes to the heirs or devisees of the vendor and his widow has no right
of dower. He dies the owner of a chose in action for the purchase
money, which passes as personal property to his executor or administra-
tor for the benefit of his legatees or next of kin,-secured by the legal
title which he held as mortgagee, and which his heirs or devisees hold
on his death for the benefit of the legatees or next of kin."
Walsh also points out that specific performance of contracts "took
form as one of the earliest and most important branches of equity, in
1969]
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F. Illegitimate Children
Much of the existing scheme of things was incorporated into
the new provisions on illegitimates. It had been provided that
illegitimates could inherit and transmit an inheritance ex parte
materna, as if they had been legitimate, but not ex parte pa-
terna.58 This rule was retained in section eleven in subpara-
graphs (d) and (e), although with some clarifying language
which stated the existing situation in Arkansas based upon the
superseded provision and case interpretations. Subparagraph
(d) stated that the illegitimate or his descendants might inherit
realty or personalty from the mother or her blood kindred as if
legitimate, but not from the father or his kindred. Subpara-
graph (e) provided that the property of an illegitimate dying
intestate would pass (in accord with the usual rules of intestacy)
to the mother and her blood kindred, but the father or his blood
kindred could not inherit from the illegitimate or his descend-
ants. Although subparagraph (e), unlike (d), did not state
that the property of the illegitimate "or his descendants" would
pass only to the mother and her kindred (subject to the intestacy
rules), presumably the inclusion of the prohibition against in-
heritance from the descendants by the father and his kin takes
care of this situation. The current Arkansas statute 9 providing
that the issue of marriages "deemed null in law or dissolved by
divorce" would be legitimate is retained in a reworded form in
subparagraph (a). The new provision is that if the parents
"have lived together as man and wife" and before the birth
"participated in a marriage ceremony in apparent compliance
with the law of the state where the marriage ceremony was
performed," the offspring is legitimate as to both parents even
though the marriage is void.60 In addition, there is a presump-
the fifteenth century, the century in which equity as a part of the Eng-
lish legal system had its real beginning." Id. at § 58. He added:
"Coke insisted that either party to a contract has an option to perform
or pay damages, and that specific performance enforced by the Chancellor
deprived him of this right. [Citing Bromage v. Genning, 1 Rolle 368,
81 Eng. Rep. 540 (1616).] This crude standard of business morality
never made any headway in the law." Id.
58. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 61-103 (1947). See Meek, Descent and
Distribution, ARKANSAS DEsK BooK 40 (1961).
59. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-104 (1947). See Walker, Legitimacy
and Paternity, 14 ARK. L. Rsv. 55 (1959); and Comment, The Effect of
Void and Voidable Marriages in Arkansas, 10 ARK. L. REV. 188 (1956).
60. This is in accord with the existing Arkansas cases. See, e.g.,
Yocum v. Holmes, 222 Ark. 251, 258 S.W.2d 535 (1953); Bruno v. Bruno,
221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953); and Daniels v. Johnson, supra
note 23. But if the parents were never married, the offspring would be
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tion that a child born or conceived during marriage is the legiti-
mate child of both spouses. This is partly expressive of the com-
mon-law presumption that a child of a lawfully married couple
is presumed to be the husband's.'1 This also is the rule followed
in the Arkansas cases. 2 Note, however, that the statute also in-
cludes children conceived during marriage. This takes care of
the situation in which the spouses were divorced before the child
was born, as did the previous statute, but it also means that if
the husband divorces the wife on grounds of adultery (or any
other grounds), a child conceived before the dissolution of the
marriage is presumed to be the child of the divorced partners.
That the previous statute apparently meant the same does not
ease the sting. If the husband believes that the child was the
product of an adulterous relationship, the burden is on him to
establish that fact in court or the child will be his heir. Of
course, a husband in such a situation might choose the easier
course of disinheriting the child in a will, perhaps also reciting
that although he is disinheriting the child, he does not believe it
to be his. This process necessarily runs the risk of the will being
declared invalid. Also, if the husband died before making a will
or changing an existing will, the child might take as a subse-
quently born child under the Arkansas statutes.6 3  The child
might even claim as a pretermitted child if the husband made a
will after the birth, but failed to mention him out of ignorance
or perhaps because he thought the basis for his divorce took
care of the problem.64 The dispute might in either of these
events then transpire between the heirs or devisees and legatees
and the child-claimant. With blood tests not always effective to
establish the absence of parentage by the deceased in such a sit-
uation, it might prove difficult to overcome the presumption.
This provision as to the presumption, incidentally, appeared in
the Third Working Draft to the Uniform Probate Code.6 5 This
provision has been omitted in the most recent draft of the pro-
.posed Code.66
illegitimate under Martin v. Martin, 212 Ark. 204, 205 S.W.2d 189 (1947),
and it apparently remains the rule under the new provision that the
parents must not only have lived together as man and wife but must also
have participated in a marriage ceremony in apparent compliance with
the law.
61. See 9 C. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2527 (3d ed. 1940).
62. See West v. King, 222 Ark. 809, 262 S.W.2d 897 (1953).
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-102 (1947).
64. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-507 (Supp. 1967).
65. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Third Working Draft, § 2-111 (Nov.
1967).
66. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft (1969).
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Another provision taken by the Arkansas drafters from the
Third Working Draft of the Uniform Probate Code is found in
subparagraph (c) relating to artificial insemination. Under this
provision a child resulting from artificial insemination per-
formed with the consent of the husband is treated as the child
of both spouses, and "consent of the husband is presumed unless
the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence." 7 This
provision has the advantage of settling for purposes of intestate
succession the question of the legitimacy of artificially conceived
children, a subject which has provoked quite a number of law
review articles."" It is desirable to deal with the problem, al-
though it probably would have been better to provide that con-
sent of the husband should be evidenced by a writing to that ef-
fect, or simply omit the presumption and provide that the prog-
eny is the child of both spouses if conceived with the consent of
the husband. To the contrary, it may be argued that the burden
should be placed on the husband to demonstrate a denial of con-
sent, since he might have done something about it while the
child had no choice in the matter. Be that as it may, the statute
provides the answer in Arkansas as to intestate' succession and
answers the argument of one student writer that at present
"such a child would probably be held illegitimate" in Arkansas"'
(although he then proceeds to argue to the contrary). 0 Also,
it places Arkansas in the company of Oklahoma as being the
only states to deal legislatively with the problem.7 Since the
67. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 11(c).
68. In Arkansas, see Note, Artificial Insemination, 23 ARK. L. REV.
81 (1969). See also, e.g., Hager, Artificial Insemination-Some Con-
siderations for Effective Counseling, 39 N.C. L. REV. 217 (1961); Koerner,
Medicolegal Considerations in Artificial Insemination, 8 LA. L. REV. 484
(1948); Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects in
Human Artificial Insemination, 36 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1959); Petz,
Artificial Insemination-Legal Aspects, 34 U. DFT. L.J. 404 (1957);
Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the
Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968); Weinberger, A Partial Solution to
Legitimacy Problems Arising from the Use of Artificial Insemination,
35 IND. L.J. 143 (1960); Note, Artificial Insemination, 34 IowA L. REV.
658 (1949); Note, Artificial Insemination, 33 MINN. L. REv. 145 (1949).i
69. Note, supra note 68, 23 ARK. L. REV. at 93.
70. Id. at 94.
71. Id. at 93, citing 10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 551-553 (Supp. 1967).
The Oklahoma provisions go beyond the problem of intestate succession
and legitimacy. They regulate the procedure with regard to consent and
limit performance of the insemination to licensed physicians. The
written consent of both the husband and the wife is required, and it
must be acknowledged by both of them, the physician, and the judge
having jurisdiction over adoption; and the written consent must be
filed under the same rules as govern adoption papers. Obviously, this
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process of artificial insemination seems to be increasing in the
frequency of use,72 and the legal situation is cloudy, the adoption
of the provision places Arkansas somewhat in the forefront in
dealing with the legal difficulties presented. In connection with
the Arkansas provisions, however, and despite the presumption,
any lawyer advising clients on the subject would be well-advised
to obtain the written consent of the husband to the procedure
immediately prior to its being performed in order to reduce the
possibility of any subsequent lawsuit on the subject. The mem-
ory of the husband of his verbal consent might dim as the wife
began visibly to carry the child of the unknown donor. It may
not present the opprobrium of an adulterous episode, but it ob-
viously raises altogether different psychological problems than
adoption.78
Subparagraph (b) of section eleven is almost identically the
second paragraph in section 61-103 of the current Arkansas Stat-
utes.7 4 It was not in the committee's final draft, but was in-
cluded by the legislature.75 Undoubtedly, the question of recog-
tends to limit the type of litigation which the Arkansas provisions
could lead to.
72. Note, supra note 68, 23 ARm. L. REV. at.81.
73. See id. at 83-85. Not only may the husband bear resentment,
but his church may regard the child as illegitimate depending upon
the circumstances and the particular church involved.
74. It provides that if the father later marries the mother of his
illegitimate child and recognizes the child to be his, it will be deemed
legitimate.
75. In adding this subparagraph, the legislature also rewrote sub-
paragraph (a) of the committee's draft in order to avoid any conflict.
As enacted, subparagraph (a) provides (as earlier discussed) for a sit-
uation in which the parents live together as man and wife and before
the birth have participated in a marriage ceremony in apparent compli-
ance with the law of the jurisdiction where it is performed. As written
by the committee, subparagraph (a) provided that if the parents "shall
have lived together as man and wife and have participated in a
marriage ceremony in apparent compliance with law before or after the
.birth" then the child would be legitimate even though the marriage
was not. This seemingly did away with the requirement of recognition
of the child by the father as his own, although obviously it would have
to be established that the male partner to the marriage was the father
of the child where the marriage took place after the birth. This is im-
plicit in the use of the word "parents" in referring to those who lived
together and participated in the marriage ceremony. Consequently,
the changes made by the legislature would not seem to be of great
significance. However, theoretically at least, the committee might be
said to have been lessening some of the rigidity which has come into
the cases, since as things now stand, there must be the elements of
(1) marriage; (2) recognition by words, acts or conduct; and (3) actual
parentage on the part of the alleged father. See Johnson v. Sanford,
239 Ark. 362, 389 S.W.2d 421 (1965); Edgar v. Dickens, 230 Ark. 7, 320
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nition of the parentage of children is a breeder of litigation. But
quite obviously, the legislature found this provision to be of
worthwhile social value and one in which they felt the gain out-
weighed the loss. Of equal obviousness is the fact that the pro-
vision involves an artificial, statutory legitimation of bastards
for inheritance purposes, and this is desirable if the new spouse
was also the father.
The provision on the right of inheritance of posthumous de-
scendants of the intestate, conceived before his death and born
afterwards, remains essentially the same as before.76 It still ap-
plies only to lineal descendants and not to collaterals, although
the reason for not applying it to collaterals seems uncertain in
light of the fact that it takes, in most instances, longer than the
gestation period to probate an estate from the decedent's death
to the point of distribution and closing.
G. Aliens
Under the prior statutes listed under descent and distribu-
tion, the alienage of an ancestor was no bar to title by descent,
the personalty of an intestate alien resident was distributed as
if he were a citizen, and an alien spouse could take the regular
distributive shares.7 Section thirteen of the Act is a substan-
S.W.2d 761 (1959); and Parker v. Hadley, 227 Ark. 161, 296 S.W.2d 391(1956). Under the committee's draft, there would only have had to be
the elements of marriage and parentage. The courts would likely have
continued to give substantial significance to acts of recognition in deter-
mining parentage, however, and so it is more of a matter of degree than
anything else. It is the author's view that the "recognition" require-
ment is probably unfortunate, all things considered, although it is not
of great moment, and if it kept the legislature happy with the balance of
the Act, then it is clearly de minimis.
76. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-102 (1947). This is section twelve-
of the Act.
77. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-105 and 61-106 (1947). See also
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-301 (1947), stating that "upon the decease of
any alien having title by purchase or descent, according to this act, to
any lands or tenements, such lands and tenements shall descend and pass
as if such alien were a citizen of the United States; and it shall be no
objection to the husband, widow or kindred of such alien, or any citizen
deceased, taking lands and tenements by virtue of the laws of this State
regulating the distribution of estates of intestates, that they are aliens."
These provisions remain unrepealed, as does ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-231
(1947), which gives the surviving spouse of an alien dower (or curtesy
presumably) in the estate of the deceased spouse, the same as if the
alien were a native-born citizen. Also note that Article 2, section 20, of
the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 provides that no distinction shall
ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens in regard to
the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.
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tial improvement over these statutes in that it provides quite
clearly that any alien may transmit or inherit property the same
as a citizen and subject to the same laws. In short, it eliminates
any distinction in intestate succession, either on the receiving
or transmitting end based on the fact that the person involved
is not an American citizen.78 No compelling reasons occur as
to why this should not be the case. The Fifth Working Draft
of the Uniform Probate Code, in similarly providing, states that
the purpose "is to eliminate the ancient rule that an alien cannot
acquire or transmit land by descent, a rule based on the feudal
notions of the obligations of the tenant to the king.179 Although
the rule did not exist as to personal property, both the Arkansas
and UPC provisions follow the premise that no distinction
should be made as to the nature of the property, or as the Code
comment states, "that distinctions between real and personal
property should be abolished."' 0
H. Degrees of Consanguinity
The committee stated: "It is felt that any code of inherit-
ance should set out the method by which degrees of consan-
guinity are computed."' With this in mind, it proceeded to pro-
vide by statute the method which Arkansas has always followed,
which is the canon law rule that the common law adopted.
8 2
Not all states follow this method. Many follow the civil law
method,8 3 which differs somewhat. It is a matter of choice,
78. This seems clearly in keeping with the provision of the Ar-
kansas Constitution described in note 77, supra.
79. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, comment to § 2-
113 (1969).
80. Id. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the United
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute which
provided for escheat if a nonresident alien could not meet the require-
ments of (1) existence of a reciprocal right of an American citizen to
take property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign
..country, (2) the right of American citizens to receive payment here of
funds from estates in the foreign country, and (3) the right of the for-
eign heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without confis-
cation by the foreign government. This case is noted in the commis-
sioners' comment. The statute (which conflicted with a treaty) was
considered an intrusion into the field of foreign affairs, which is ex-
clusively a federal matter.
81. Committee comment to Section 14 of the Act.
82. See Meek, Descent and Distribution, ARKANSAS DESK BOOK 13
(1961). See also Locke v. Cook, 245 Ark. 777, 434 S.W.2d 598 (1968), and
Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657 (1852).
83. Under the "civil law" method, the next of kin were determined
by degrees. Each generation between the decedent and the claimant,
by counting through the common ancestor, amounted to a degree. See.
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and the committee's choice and the author's choice is the com-
mon law rule now incorporated into statutory law. Under this
rule, you start with the common ancestor of any two kinsmen
and count downwards. They are related in the degree in which
they are distant from the common ancestor. As the statute
spells out, by way of illustration, X and his nephew are related
in the second degree because the nephew is two degrees removed
from the common ancestor, the grandparent. The Arkansas
Desk Book's discussion by .Harry Meek of descent and distribu-
tion begins with a table of consanguinity which allows rapid
computation of degrees of relationship.
I. Adopted Children
In comparison with the simple provisions of the Fifth Work-
ing Draft of the Uniform Probate Code on adopted children, the
Arkansas provisions seem complicated and unduly wordy. The
UPC's most recent draft provides that an adopted child for in-
heritance purposes "is the child of an adopting parent and not
of the natural parents except that adoption ... by the spouse of
a natural parent shall have no effect on the relationship between
the child and that natural parent. '8 4 Or, in short, an adopted
child is the same as a natural child.
If the Arkansas provisions are wordy, it must be said in par-
tial defense that the work of the committee was not eased by
such decisions as Hawkins v. Hawkins.8 5 To the extent that it
dealt with multiple adoptions, this case was overruled by sub-
paragraph (c) of section seventeen providing that a child
adopted more than once would be treated as the child of the
parents who most recently adopted him and not the prior adop-
tive parents.8 6
J. RIcHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS ESTATES AND TRusTs 13,
fn. 23 (3d ed. 1967). Most American jurisdictions have employed the
civil law method. Id. at 47. See, e.g., Thomas v. Marriott, 154 Md. 107,
140 Atl. 91 (1928); Draper v. Draper, 174 Tenn. 394, 126 S.W.2d 307
(1939).
84. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-109(1) (1969).
85. 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951), which held that an adopted
son was the heir of his first adoptive father even though he had subse-
quently been adopted by others before his first adoptive father died.
86. This provision was based on the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Third
Working Draft, § 2-109(b) (Nov. 1967). The "exception" in the Fifth
Draft of the UPC (that this provision has no effect on the relationship
between the child and a natural parent who is the spouse of the adopting
parent) should be taken care of by subparagraph (d) of section seven-
teen of the Arkansas Act which permits the adopted child to inherit from
his natural parents and their kindred.
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The extensive committee comment prepared by Mr. Meek
noted that the new Arkansas provisions were "intended to es-
tablish beyond doubt that an adopted child may inherit from
the kindred of the adoptive parents." Under the existing law,
he could inherit from his adoptive parents (and also from his
natural parents) ,s7 Moreover, the adoptive parents and "their
heirs and next of kin" could inherit from the adopted child or
from descendants of the adopted child, except for ancestral prop-
erty which the adopted child acquired from his natural par-
ents.88 But the authorities on inheritance by the adopted child
from ascendants or collaterals of the adoptive parents had been
somewhat conflicting.8 9 The committee's provision represents
the better and more modern approach, i.e., to remove com-
pletely any distinctions involving the adopted child with respect
to the adopting parents and their kindred and to make him, in
the eyes of the law, the same as a natural child. (In that regard
it might be urged that such a philosophy should cut the adopted
child off entirely from its natural parents and their kindred for
inheritance as well as other purposes; however, the blood rela-
tionship apparently provides the rationale for continuance of the
present rule in subparagraph (d).) In any event, the modern
concept of the place of the adopted child is expressed in subsec-
tion (a) of section seventeen in which it is stated that the adopted
child and his descendants will inherit "from his adoptive parents
and from the lineal ascendants, lineal descendants and collateral
kindred of such adoptive parents, to the same extent and with
the same rights as if he were the natural child of such adoptive
parents" and further that "the natural child of such adoptive
parents shall enjoy no priorities or preferences over adopted
children." In view of the abolition of ancestral estates it was
unnecessary for the statute to say so, but it stated nonetheless
that where the property of an intestate adoptive parent had
87. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 56-109(c) and (d) (1947).
88. Id. at (b).
89. See 15 ARK. L. REV. 194, 199 (1961): "Although there have
been no decisions in Arkansas developing the issue of the right of an
adopted child to inherit from persons other than both his adopted and
natural parents under the laws of descent and distribution or by will,
it has been held that adopted children of a pre-deceased legatee were
within the statute preventing lapse of legacy where the legatee leaves 'a
child or other descendent' [sic] si'rviving the testator, and are entitled to
the legacy. [Citing Dean v. Smith, 195 Ark. 614, 113 S.W.2d 485 (1938),
decided under a statute prior to the present Code provision which in-
cludes adopted children of the deceased testator.] To date, the outer
limit of Arkansas statutory interpretation seems to include adopted
children under the term 'children' but neither 'heirs' nor 'bodily heirs'."
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come to him by gift, descent or devise from one of the intestate's
parents or a blood relative, "the adopted child (or his descend-
ants) shall not be excluded from inheritance . . on the ground
that he lacks the blood" of the parent or relative from whom it
came 0 Subsection (b) permits the adoptive parents and their
kindred to inherit from the adopted child (or his descendants)
the same as if the child were natural born. 1
Although the adopted child may inherit from the natural
parents and their collateral and lineal kindred, as previously
mentioned, they cannot inherit from him except in situations in
which the natural parent marries or remarries and the child
is adopted by the step-parent.92  This again essentially continues
the existing law.
Subsection (f), stating that an adopted child will take as a
pretermitted child if not mentioned by name or by reference to
a class in the will of an adoptive parent, is probably unnecessary
in the light of the expression and intent of subsections (a) and
(b) eliminating the distinction between natural and adopted
children.9 3 The clear import of the earlier provisions would be
that a testamentary reference to children as a class would neces-
sarily include the adopted child. This subsection must be
ascribed to the concern of the committee (which permeates the
entire Act) to leave no doubt as to the result in a particular situ-
ation and thereby minimize judicial error and interpretive con-
fusion. The same is true of subsection (g), which provides that
the new provisions are not intended to alter the Arkansas anti-
lapse provisions as applied to adopted children.9 4
Subsection (h) of section seventeen is a new provision which
was included to deal with situations involving conflict of laws.
In Shaver v. Nash,95 the Arkansas court refused to recognize for
inheritance purposes the validity of a non-judicial Texas adop-
tion which was valid under the Texas statutes. Our new Act
90. This is contrary to the provisions of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-109
(b) (1947). This statute has been repealed in its entirety by the new
Act.
91. This is the same as under the old statute.
92. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 17(e).
93. However, this provision is in line with such Arkansas cases as
Graham v. Hill, 226 Ark. 258, 289 S.W.2d 186 (1956); Dean v. Smith,
195 Ark. 614, 113 S.W.2d 485 (1938); Grimes v. Jones, 193 Ark. 858, 103
S.W.2d 359 (1937); and James v. Helmich, 186 Ark. 1053, 57 S.W.2d 829
(1933).
94. For the Arkansas anti-lapse statute, see ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-410 (Supp. 1967).
95. 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S.W.2d 298 (1930).
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provides that where the child was adopted elsewhere, the adop-
tion will be recognized in Arkansas and the Arkansas rules of
intestate succession applied "if the adoption was effected in a
court of competent jurisdiction through judicial proceedings
which effectually separated the child from his natural parents
and inducted the child into the family of the adopting parents."96
It should be observed that this does not remedy the problem of
the ineffectiveness in Arkansas in inheritance situations of the
statutorily legal, but non-judicial, Texas adoption. It would
have been better to reverse Shaver v. Nash by providing that
any adoption which is legal under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which it is consummated will be binding in determining heirship
in Arkansas.97 Although it may be pointed out that Arkansas
does not recognize common law marriages or nuncupative wills
(which are valid in some states), the reason would seem to be
far more compelling than the failure to recognize foreign adop-
tions.
The statute also follows the rule that the devolution of Ar-
kansas realty (and Arkansas personalty if the intestate was dom-
iciled in Arkansas at the time of his death) is controlled by
Arkansas law.98
J. The Removal of Some Feudal Appendages
The battle of printer's ink has been waged over whether the
Doctrine of Worthier Title99 even existed in Arkansas. Some
96. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 17(h).
97. R. LEFLAR, AMERCAN CONFLICTS LAW § 242 (1968) states: "The
second state, having recognized the validity of the adoptive status, is
completely free to apply its own law as it pleases to incidental rights
and duties asserted under the status." Thus, Arkansas may apparently
do as it pleases, although it would seem that the better rule in this
instance would be to accept the foreign adoption for all purposes in-
cluding the devolution and distribution of property.
98. See LEFLAR, supra note 97.
99. The doctrine has two branches, the wills branch and the
inter vivos branch. The Restatement indicates that the wills branch is
no longer a part of American law. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 314, com-
ment j (1940). Presumably, this branch is non-existent insofar as Ar-
kansas law is concerned. See Comment, supra note 10, at 396-404, in
which it is concluded that this branch of the doctrine was probably re-jected in West v. Williams, 15 Ark. 682 (1855). However, two leading
texts cite West v. Williams for the argument that Arkansas approved
the wills branch: W. PAGE, WILLS § 214 (3d ed. 1941), and G. THoMP-
SON, WILLS § 74 (2d ed. 1936). It has been contended that Page and
Thompson were probably in error. Wright, supra note 11, at 259-260,
fn. 54. Under the wills branch, if the will gave a freehold to an heir
of the testator which was of the same quality and quantity that the
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felt that it did; 00 some argued that it did not;10 and some in-
ferred that it was impossible to tell whether the Arkansas court
recognized situations in which it might apply.'0 2 In any
event, the committee and the legislature put an end to the great
debate over the worthier title trivia. Lifting the language from
the Uniform Property Act, the committee in sections twenty-one
and twenty-two abolished the doctrine. Section twenty-one
provided that in a "testamentary conveyance" the "conveyees"
(devisees) take by purchase and not by descent, and section
twenty-two provided the same with respect to conveyances inter
vivos.10
latter would have taken by descent (if the testator had died intestate),
the estate would pass by descent rather than by devise.
The inter vivos branch of the rule is to the effect that if a land-
owner grants a life estate to A, with a remainder in the grantor's heirs,
the remainder is ineffective and the grantor is left having a reversion.
This branch of the rule has some significance in that the grantor could
transfer his reversion to someone else by a devise or a conveyance.
Also, creditors could levy on it, and the reversion is a taxable part of
the estate. See Wright, supra note 11, at 260. This branch of the rule
is still viable in some states, but has been softened in some jurisdictions
into a rule of construction rather than a rule of law. See Braswell v.
Braswell, 195 Va. 971, 81 S.E.2d 560 (1954).
100. See 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 375, at 264 (1967); 1 Am=-
cAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.19, at 441 (1952); 3 SnMS & SMITH, supra
note 10, § 1605 (2d ed. 1956); Fetters, supra note 10, 21 ARx. L. Rsv. at
147.
101. Comment, supra note 10, at 409-410.
102. Wright, supra note 11, at 262-263. The argument swirled
around two cases for the most part: Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583,
227 S.W.2d 449 (1950) and Wilson v. Pharris, 203 Ark. 614, 158 S.W.2d
274 (1941). It was concluded: "Fletcher v. Ferrill serves to render some
doubt as to whether the inter vivos branch of the doctrine is a rule
of property in Arkansas. Offsetting it, however, is the unfortunate
quotation utilized in Wilson v. Pharris (from E. WASHBURN, REAL
PROPERTY 395 (1887).) The sum total of the situation is that, as is
quite often the case in the law of future interests in Arkansas, the situa-
tion on the subject of worthier title is confused." Wright, supra note
11, at 263.
103. The committee's comment states that it is intended that these
provisions abolish (or put to rest any doubt as to the abolition of) both
branches of the rule in Arkansas. Thus, a will devising property to
"heirs or next of kin" would result in the property passing by devise.
Further, a conveyance inter vivos to "heirs or next of kin" of the
grantor, "which conveyance creates one or more prior interests in favor
of a person or persons in existence," results in the heirs or next of kin
taking by purchase.
The language of section twenty-one, which pertains to the wills
branch, is a bit odd in referring to a "testamentary conveyance" and
the "conveyor" and "conveyees." However, it is clearly intended to take
care of testamentary dispositions, and there is no question that the court
would construe it as doing away with the wills branch, particularly in
view of the fact that the wills branch probably was non-existent in
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Section fifteen permits kinsmen of the half blood to inherit
equally with kinsmen of the whole blood, and somewhat simi-
larly, the doctrine of the first purchaser was abolished in section
sixteen of the Act. Under the common law first purchaser rule,
as stated in the statute, the intestate's property "would descend
only to such of his heirs as were of the blood of the next preced-
ing ancestor in the line of successive descents who acquired title
by 'purchase' " rather than by descent. Although many doubt-
less thought that this ancient doctrine had long since been laid
to rest in Arkansas,'0 4 the Arkansas Supreme Court resurrected
it in Cupp v. Frazier's Heirs.10 5 While the abolition of ancestral
estates in the new Act would seem to be sufficient to do away
with the first purchaser doctrine, the committee wished to leave
no doubt about it.1 6 Consequently, the committee again wisely
decided to "spell it out" that the doctrine of the first purchaser
had at last been accorded a long-awaited and richly deserved
grave.
K. Advancements and Debts
The committee again turned to the Third Working Draft of
the Uniform Probate Code for provisions on advancements and
debts.10 7 Under these provisions, as the comment of the Com-
missioners' UPC Committee notes, 08 the common law relating
to advancements is changed by the requirement of written evi-
dence of the intent that an inter vivos gift be an advancement.
Arkansas even before the statute. See note 99, supra. Section twenty-
two, dealing with the inter vivos branch, is a good statement which
leaves little to interpretation and was the key provision anyway, since
the real question dealt with the inter vivos branch. Section 14 of the
Uniform Property Act (incorporated here) has previously been adopted
by at least five states, thereby abolishing the rule in those states. See
Wright, supra note 11, at 264.
104. In Meek, supra note 58, 11, it was stated that the first pur-
chaser doctrine "has affected the Arkansas law to an uncertain extent"
and that it would be "difficult . . . to give an affirmative opinion" on
the state of the Arkansas law as to that rule.
105. 239 Ark. 77, 387 S.W.2d 328 (1965). See Comment, supra note
10, at 399.
106. The committee comment stated: "Since this Act is designed to
do away with ancestral estates, it may be that the first purchaser rule
is automatically abolished; but the committee felt that it might be
prudent to place in the Act a section forever renouncing this old medie-
val rule." Committee comment to No. 303, [1969J Ark. Acts § 16.
107. The section on advancements was a reproduction of the UNI-
FORM PROBATE CODE, Third Working Draft, § 2-113 (Nov. 1967), and the
section on debts reproduced § 2-114 of the same.
108. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-111, commit-
tee comment at 31 (1969).
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The prior Arkansas provision 0 9 had simply provided for ad-
vancements to be computed in determining the child's share.
Under these new provisions, therefore, there is no advancement
unless it is declared or acknowledged in writing to be such. Ex-
cept for writings in which the intent is not clearly expressed,
this should serve to minimize litigation over whether the gift is
an advancement or not. It eliminates the necessity in Arkansas
of determining whether the parent actually intended the transfer
to be an advancement.110
For purposes of evaluating the advancement, the basis is the
value as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment
of the property or as of the time of the decedent's death, which-
ever occurs first. If the recipient of the gift does not survive
the intestate, the property is not included in computing the
share of the recipient's descendants. This latter provision may
seem to provide something of an incongruity, particularly if the
descendants are to take per stirpes from an intestate. If the ad-
vancement would have counted against that share had the re-
cipient of the gift lived, and if it were clearly an advancement
to him (having been stated in writing to be such), then why
should it not count against the same share which his descendants
will take by representation? One reasonable answer would seem
to be that the advancement received by the deceased heir might
not go at his death to his descendants. He might leave it to Fifi
LaTour, the go-go dancer at the Flesh Pot Follies. Therefore,
his descendants, having not profited by the advancement, should
not be deprived by its disappearance. Also, it might be dissi-
pated in other ways during the lifetime of the recipient so that
his descendants would never profit. Moreover, the statute re-
fers to advancements to "an heir," and the recipient of an ad-
vancement cannot be an "heir" unless he survives the intestate.
The Commissioners noted this fact in a comment in both the
Third Working Draft and the most recent (Fifth Working) Draft:
The statute is phrased in terms of the donee being an "heir" be-
cause the transaction is regarded as of the decedent's death; of
course, the donee is only a prospective heir at the time of the
transfer during lifetime. Most inter vivos transfers today are
109. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-116 (1947).
110. Cf. Shaver v. Johnson, 233 Ark. 165, 343 S.W.2d 105 (1961),
which illustrates the proof requirements under the old rule. The court
had to take evidence to determine whether an advancement was involved
(and in that case it was found that the evidence established that a
conveyance to a son was an advancmeent of his share of the "home
place"). See also, Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665, 26
A.L.R. 1101 (1920).
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intended to be absolute gifts or are carefully integrated into a
total estate plan. If the donor intends that any transfer during
lifetime be deducted from the donee's share of his estate, the
donor may either execute a will so providing or, if he intends
to die intestate, charge the gift as an advance by a writing with-
in the present section. The present section applies only when
the decedent dies intestate and not when he leaves a will.
Nonetheless, a contrary argument may be presented in con-
nection with the advancement not counting against the heirs of
a donee when it would have counted against the donee himself
had he survived the intestate. The whole idea of taking per
stirpes, or by stocks, or by representation (however it may be
expressed), is that the share of the ancestor is taken by his de-
scendants by way of substitution. He is no longer there; so they
take what he would have received. If he would have received
less or perhaps nothing due to an advancement, then why should
they receive anything? Recognizing this argument, the Com-
missioners made a slight change in the wording of the Fifth
Working Draft which causes it to differ from the third Working
Draft (on which the Arkansas provision is based). The Fifth
Working Draft states that if the recipient fails to survive the
decedent, the propety shall not be taken into account in com-
puting the share of the descendants "unless the declaration or ac-
knowledgment provides otherwise."1 1' This leaves the way open
to the intestate donor to declare a gift to be an advancement in
writing and make it an advancement not only to the donee but
also as against his descendants. An amendment to the Arkansas
provision along this line is probably desirable.
The new provision on debts is also taken from the Third
Working Draft of the UPC and provides that debts owed to the
decedent shall not be charged against the intestate share of any-
one except the debtor, and thus, as in the case of advancements,
the debt shall not be considered in computing the share of the
debtor's descendants. The only change in this UPC provision
between the third and fifth working drafts was to change the
last few words to read, "in computing the intestate share of the
debtor's issue.11112 The addition of the word "intestate" adds
nothing, since the preceding sentence had referred to the intes-
tate share, and the substitution of the word, "issue," changes
nothing since the UPC defines "issue" as meaning all of a per-
son's lineal descendants, except those who are lineal descendants
of a living lineal descendant. 18 It is clear that the Arkansas
111. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-111 (1969).
112. See Id., § 2-112.
113. Id., § 1-201(q).
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(and UPC Third Working Draft) provision did not refer to the
lineal descendants of a living lineal. Thus, these minor changes
as to the debt provision in the two drafts are insignificant.
II. ANCESTRAL ESTATES
In 1968 the author wrote with respect to ancestral estates
that "this perversion is a clear throwback, at best, to a time
when our laws were geared to a plantation society and, at worst,
to the feudal period itself. This anomaly should be aban-
doned."114 Harry Meek, in his discussion of descent and distri-
bution in the Arkansas Desk Book, had noted the confusion and
conflicts presented by our ancestral estates and related provi-
sions.1" 5 The abolition of ancestral estates for purposes of intes-
tate succession, which the new Act accomplishes, should there-
fore come as one of its most pleasing features.
Section eighteen of the Act provides that for purposes of
intestate succession, the distinction between ancestral estates
and new acquisitions as to an intestate's real estate is abolished.
Further, the same rules of inheritance are to apply as to devolu-
tion of both real and personal property in all instances. In com-
menting on these provisions, Mr. Meek stated for the commit-
tee:
The problems arising in Arkansas out of this general classifica-
tion have resulted in much confusion among laymen and law-
yers and have resulted in a vast amount of litigation. It is felt
that simplicity and substantial justice will be achieved if the
same formula for inheritance is applied to personalty and
realty and without regard to whether the heritable property
be a new acquisition or ancestral." 6
The absence of ancestral estates may be a novelty in Ar-
kansas, but it hardly comes as such nationally. Powell's work
on real property states that ancestral/new acquisition distinc-
tions prevail on a general scale only in Arkansas, Delaware and
Tennessee. 1 7 My own research in 1968 also found Delaware and
Tennessee to be the only jurisdictions other than Arkansas which
still recognized ancestral estates."18 Through an examination of
114. Wright, supra note 11, at 268.
115. Meek, supra note 58, 14, 16-17. And see Oliver v. Vance, 34
Ark. 564, 567 (1879), which referred to "our confused and incongruous
law of descents and distribution", and which Mr. Meek cited as an indi-
cation that our law of descent and distribution had "obfuscated Ar-
kansas Lawyers for more than one hundred years." Meek, supra note
58, at 17.
116. Committee comment to No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 18.
117. 6 POWELL, supra note 100, § 1001 at 675 (1969).
118. Wright, supra note 11, at 268, fn. 84.
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the law summaries in Martindale-Hubbell, Mr. Meek commented
that the indication seemed "that such classifications are now em-
ployed on a general scale only in Arkansas and Kentucky and
on a limited scale in Tennessee."" 9 Whatever the situation, it
was quite clear to the committee that Arkansas stood with a
distinct and apparently diminishing small minority of states
which still adhered to the bifurcation. As summarized in Amer-
ican Jurisprudence, second edition:
The doctrine which prescribes a separate course of descent for
ancestral estates is not favored in American law, and this has
been said to be true even in jurisdictions in which the doctrine
still exists. Where not required by statute, the doctrine has
been repudiated, and in several states, statutes which formerly
distinguished ancestral property for purposes of descent have
been abrogated by later statutes. 120
So, with some exceptions, ancestral estates in Arkansas van-
ished unlamented into the past, eliminating one more ancient
trap which had served to confuse lawyers and laymen and ob-
scure a determination of land ownership.
One exception, of course, is that as to persons dying intes-
tate before the effective date of the Act (at midnight on De-
cember 31, 1969) ,121 their property will pass under the old law.
Consequently, by the end of the year, ancestral estates may be
gone, but not forgotten. Title examiners for quite some years
to come will have to be aware of the reason why, in 1969 or be-
fore, Aunt Minnie (of the paternal side) wound up with the
land while Uncle George (from the maternal side) was left out.
The more important exception, however, was written into
the Act at the last minute. A January committee draft had
abolished ancestral estates entirely and for all purposes. But
the final committee draft of February 1, 1969, which was adopted
with relatively few legislative changes, stated that ancestral es-
tates were abolished "[o]nly for the purposes of Intestate suc-
cession.' '1 22  The reason was explained in the comment thusly:
This section is not intended to abolish the distinctions between
Ancestral and New Acquisition property found in the dower
and curtesy statutes. See Sections 61-206 and 61-228. It is not
necessarily inconsistent to observe the distinction in connection
with dower and curtesy and to disregard it for inheritance
purposes.
119. Committee comment, supra note 116.
120. 23 AM. JuR. 2d, Descent and Distribution § 75 (1965).
121. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 26.
122. The committee draft of January 14, 1969, read the. same as the
provision enacted, except that it was not begun with the words quoted
in the text. It simply abolished ancestral estates without exception.
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For illustration, where the husband inherits land, or acquires it
by gift or devise, his wife contributes nothing toward this ac-
quisition. But as his helpmate, in the performance of her do-
mestic duties, it may be said that the wife does contribute
something toward the husband's exertions to acquire wealth
during the marriage. Therefore, there may be a good reason
for giving the widow a greater dower interest in the husband's
new acquisition than in his ancestral realty. The community
property laws usually exclude from the community property
acquired by the husband through gift, devise or inheritance. 15
Am. Jur. 2d, Page 839. Though not directly in point, see Mc-
Guire v. Benton State Bank, 232 Ark. 1008, 1012; 342 S.W.2d
77.123
It may not be "necessarily inconsistent" for lawyers to observe
the ancestral/new acquisition distinction with respect to dower
and curtesy and forget about it for inheritance purposes, but it
would seem that they would find the distinction both incon-
venient and lacking in plausible reason. Moreover, while it may
123. Committee comment, supra note 116. In addition to the com-
ments quoted in the text, Mr. Adrian Williamson of Monticello, a very
knowledgeable lawyer who is an expert in the probate field and a
member of the American Bar Association's Advisory Committee to the
Uniform Probate Code Committee, justified the continued adherence to
the ancestral property-new acquisition distinction in regard to dower
and curtesy in the following manner: "When the Committee on Pro-
bate Law had completed its work in drafting and- submitting to the
Legislature the proposed bill which became Act 287 of 1967, amending
numerous sections of the Probate Code, the Committee determined to
proceed to draft proposed bills amending (1) the statutory law which has
traditionally been known as the law of descent and distribution, and
(2) the statutory law relating to dower and curtesy. I feel sure that
... the Committee adopted, as a matter of policy, a plan to prepare and
submit to the Legislature separate proposed bills to accomplish the two
purposes last above indicated, for the same reason that they were not
dealt with in the Bill amending existing provisions of the Probate Code,
i.e., that if the subjects were combined in one bill, both objectives might
be defeated because a sufficient number of legislators might be ada-
mant in their objection to changes made in either that part of the bill -
or the part relating to dower and curtesy." Mr. Williamson goes on to
state that he felt it would have been unwise for the Committee to take
any action which would get into dower/curtesy in any way. Letter to
the author from Adrian Williamson, of Williamson, Williamson & Ball,
Monticello, Arkansas, June 10, 1969. His views on the political aspects
are possibly well-taken. My feeling to the contrary relates not necessar-
ily to disagreement on the political considerations, but to the view that
the committee was not dealing with dower and curtesy in abolishing an-
cestral estates, but (as the January draft purported) purely with an-
cestral estates. Thus, the effect on dower and curtesy was simply an
incident of the abolition of ancestral estates. Also, as the text attempts
to indicate, the end result of section nineteen of the Act (with regard to
heirship by the wife in the absence of descendants) is to make the
dower/curtesy distinction in ancestral estates inapplicable in prob-
ably the great majority of situations despite the language of section
eighteen.
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not be necessarily inconsistent, on a "reward" type of theory,
to say that the wife contributed toward new acquisitions but
did not contribute toward ancestral windfalls, what good purpose
is served by preserving the distinction? Certainly, it is contrary
both to the majority approach and the modern trend in common
law jurisdictions to distinguish at all on this basis. Further, if
in the absence of the ancestral rule, property acquired by gift,
descent or devise from the paternal side is now to ascend to the
parents equally, where is the rationale for favoring the intes-
tate's mother in such a situation while cutting back on the
share of the intestate's spouse? In short, either the ancestral
distinction has some validity to it based on blood and how the
property came, or it does not have validity. Arkansas has now
joined the vast majority of American jurisdictions in saying that
it does not, but has left behind a rather useless appendage of the
past suggesting that maybe it does. It is an oddity that will
hopefully be abandoned by an appropriate amendment at a fu-
ture session of the legislature.
This distinction which applies to the surviving spouse ap-
pears even more curious in the light of section nineteen of the
Act, subsequently discussed herein at length. The "heritable
estate" defined in section seven of the Act includes ancestral
property, since it includes (subject to dower, homestead, stat-
utory allowances and the like) every right, title and interest of
the intestate not terminated by death. Ancestral property as-
cended under the Arkansas statute, of course, only when there
were no descendants.1 2 4 Under section nineteen of the Act, if
there are no descendants, then the entire heritable estate of the
intestate passes "to the Intestate's surviving spouse" unless the
spouses have been continuously married less than the three pre-
ceding years, in which event half of the estate passes to the sur-
viving spouse. Thus, the end effect of preserving the ancestral
estates distinction as it relates to dower and curtesy is that
where the spouses have been married for less than three years,
and there are no descendants, the surviving spouse takes fifty
percent of the heritable estate as an heir, but dower or curtesy
in the total estate is affected by whether it is ancestral or a new
acquisition. The distinction is thus curious and somewhat de
minimis, serving no demonstrably useful purpose.
124. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-110 (1947).
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III. DEVOLUTION OF ESTATE OF INTESTATE
The most important change in the general law of descent
and distribution is that already mentioned, in which the surviv-
ing spouse becomes the primary heir if there are no lineal de-
scendants. The provision relating to the initial passage of the
property to the "children, or their descendants, in equal parts"12
has been rewritten to spell out that where a child of the intestate
has predeceased him leaving descendants, the per stirpes/per
capita provisions of the Act are applied. 12 In the absence of de-
scendants the surviving spouse takes the estate unless he or she
was married to the intestate for less than three continuous years
next preceding the intestate's death.127 This is an heirship stat-
ute, of course, and under it the surviving spouse only takes one-
half if the death comes within the three-year period. But the
three-year proviso has only limited effect in view of the fact that
Arkansas' dower and curtesy statutes remain wholly intact. The
result, in the case of a widow married less than the three con-
tinuous years, is simply that she takes one-half by heirship and
much of the rest of the estate by dower under Arkansas Statute
Section 61-206. She would not take it all, of course, since the
heritable estate is by definition (in section seven) subject to
dower and curtesy, among other things. These things to which
it is subject would be first deducted. Thus, if by dower a widow
would take one-half of the estate in the absence of descendants,
creditors and ancestral property, she would (if married less than
the three-year period) still only take one-half of the remainder
after these deductions. She might even take less, of course, since
her dower is only one-third as against creditors, and if there
were ancestral realty involved, she would only take a life estate.
It is obvious nonetheless that the three-year provision is not of
much aid in preventing what these provisions are usually di--
rected toward-the situation of the old fool marrying the young
filly.
Where an intestate leaves no descendants or spouse, the es-
tate passes to the parents of the decedent equally or the sole sur-
viving parent. 28 The old provision that new acquisitions passed
to the parents (or parent) for life and then to the collateral kin-
dred of the intestate"29 has been eliminated, as has the conflict
125. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-101 (1947).
126. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 19(a).
127. Id. at § 19(b).
128. Id. at § 19(c).
129. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-110 (1947).
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between this more specific provision and the general descent
statute.180 The parents would also take one-half of the heritable
estate (although it will amount to much less than the spouse's
share), if the surviving spouse had been continuously married to
the deceased intestate for less than three years."' The same
would be true in the case of those next in line after the parents.
After the parents, in order of priority, come the brothers and
sisters of the intestate and their descendants."12 Then come the
grandparents, uncles and aunts and their descendants in equal
parts.' 33 This clarifies the old doubts as to whether the grand-
parents could inherit even though the general statute of descent
listed them equally with the uncles and aunts." 4  Moreover, dis-
tinctions between maternal or paternal lines have been expressly
eliminated.1"5 Finally, the last in line are the great grandpar-
ents and great uncles and aunts and their descendants.1 6 In all
cases the per capita and per stirpes provisions earlier discussed
are followed.
The termination of descent with the great grandparents
and great uncles and aunts and their descendants is another ma-
jor change in that under the existing Arkansas law, the inherit-
ance possibilities were, as the statute said, "without end.""37  As
Harry Meek pointed out in the committee comment, it was ridic-
ulous to ask a judge to find that the decedent left no heirs and
the property escheated to the state. In truth, the deceased was
bound to have a distant cousin, many times removed, some-
where. As Mr. Meek put it: "Blackstone estimated that any
person had at least 270 million of kindred in the 15th degree
based on the assumption that each couple of ancestors had two
children and that each of those children on the average left two
more."' 3 Thus, what any Arkansas escheat proceeding really
meant was that through diligent and reasonable efforts no heirs
could be found-not that there actually were none. By limiting
the inheritance to no higher than the great grandparents, great
uncles and aunts and their descendants, the committee sought to
relieve this situation. The result is that what are often called
130. Meek, supra note 58, at 17.
131. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 19(d).
132. Id. at § 19(e).
133. Id. at § 19(f).
134. See Meek, supra note 58, at 36-37.
135. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-111 (1947), and compare with No.
303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 19(f).
136. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 19(g).
137. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-101 (1947).
138. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 19, committee comment.
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"laughing heirs" have been eliminated in Arkansas, at least to
the extent of cutting out the more jovial of that group. In this
respect the committee was still somewhat more conservative
than the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code who (though the
Code has not yet been approved, as of this writing) will appar-
ently terminate inheritance with the grandparents or their is-
sue. 3 9 This is said to be "in line with modern policy" which
"eliminates more remote relative tracing through great-grand-
parents.'140  The UPC also divides the estate half and half be-
tween the paternal and maternal grandparents.' 4 1 In both of
these situations, it would seem that the Arkansas provisions are
superior to the UPC provisions, and in fact, the UPC provisions
appear retrogressive in dividing the estate between the paternal
and maternal sides on the level of the grandparents. Uncles and
aunts do not share equally with the grandparents under the
UPC,' 4 2 however, and in this respect (although it is a minor
matter), it would seem that the UPC is correct. An intestate is
generally more likely to bear a close relationship with his grand-
parents than with his uncles and aunts. 43
In moving the surviving spouse into the number two posi-
tion as an heir of the intestate, the Arkansas Act is following a
national pattern toward making the spouse a primary heir, al-
though the Arkansas response obviously falls short of what is
taking place. There seems to have developed a national realiza-
tion that most people anticipate that their spouses, not their chil-
dren, will inherit their estates (or the bulk of such estates) if
they should die without a will. In fact, it seems readily appar-
ent that the great majority of "simple wills" are drafted to assure
that such is the case. The compelling thought for a young man
with minor children is that title to property which is not owned
as a tenancy by the entirety (or joint tenancy with right of sur-.
vivurship in those states which do not have tenancies by the
139. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-103 (1969).
(Note: The Uniform Probate Code was approved after this article was
written, although the official draft was unavailable as of final proof-
reading.)
140. Id., committee comment.
141. Id., § 2-103(4).
142. Id. The paternal grandparents, for example, will take under
the UPC in preference to their issue if either is living. Only if both are
deceased will their issue take.
143. As stated in a previous article: An intestate "would likely
choose, in most instances, his brothers and sisters over his grandparents,
and almost certainly his grandparents over his aunts and uncles ......
Wright, supra note 11, at 268.
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entirety) will pass in large measure to the children if he dies in-
testate, and will necessitate the creation of a guardianship in
order to sell the property. (The problems inherent in creating
too many tenancies by the entirety, in lieu of a will, should also
not be overlooked.)144 Even in the case of older people with
grown children, it is often if not usually the desire of the hus-
band that the wife have his property and that what is left when
she dies should pass to the children. In all of this, of course, we
are speaking of moderate-sized or small estates with either no
estate tax problems or only relatively minor ones. Thus, if it is
the object of an inheritance statute to provide a statutory will
for those who fail to execute one of their own choosing (most of
whom will be people of small or moderate holdings), and to
make the statute as much as possible like the will which the
majority would choose, the clear conclusion is that the first and
primary heir should be the surviving spouse.
The Uniform Probate Code has taken this approach. Under
the provisions of the Fifth Working Draft, in the absence of sur-
viving issue or a parent of the deceased, the entire net intestate
estate passes to the surviving spouse. 145 If there are no surviv-
ing issue, but a surviving parent or parents, then the first $50,000
(which is bracketed to permit states to alter the amount) plus
half of the balance of the net estate passes to the surviving
spouse.146 If issue survive, all of whom are issue of the surviving
spouse also, the same formula is followed. 1 47  If issue survive,
but one or more are not issue of the surviving spouse, the spouse
takes one-half of the net intestate estate. 148 In the cases except
the latter (and except, obviously, where the spouse took the en-
tire estate), the surviving spouse's share would be reduced in
the case of partial intestacy by any amount devised to the spouse
by will.149
As mentioned, the initial sum to which the spouse is entitled
is bracketed in the UPC's most recent draft, and many states
may choose a lesser sum than $50,000 (which in Arkansas, at
least, would give the entire estate to the surviving spouse in most
instances). It could be $10,000 or $20,000, or some other amount,
plus one-half. The major point, however, is that the trend is to
144. See Warner, Tenancies by the Entirety-An Estate Planner's
Dilemma or A Study of Unintended Result, 23 ARK. L. REV. 44 (1969).
145. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-102(1) (1969).
146. Id. at § 2-102 (2).
147. Id. at § 2-102(3).
148. Id. at § 2-102(4).
149. Id. at § 2-102(2) (3).
19691
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
make the surviving spouse the primary and principal heir.150
It should also be noted, without conducting any extensive
campaign for it, that the outmoded concepts of dower and curtesy
should be abolished.1 15 This is not to say that the spouse would
then receive nothing upon the death intestate of the other mari-
tal partner. The surviving spouse should be made the primary
heir to such an extent, either in money or percentage of the net
estate or a combination of the two, as is deemed appropriate.
This would take the place of dower and curtesy. The same de-
sired results would then be achieved as in the present situation
but without these ancient relics of dower, curtesy and their inci-
dents. For those who fear that one spouse would choose to dis-
inherit the other by will or a will substitute, the UPC provides
a number of sections dealing with the elective share of the sur-
viving spouse.'152 Under these provisions, the surviving spouse
is entitled to elect to take one-third of the "augmented net es-
tate" which includes Certain transfers made during marriage. 158
These provisions are rather lengthy, but they seek to correct the
problem of deprivation of the surviving, spouse of his or her
share.
One last point should be mentioned concerning descent
under the new Arkansas Act. If there is a surviving spouse of
less than three years duration but no other relatives to whom
the property of the intestate can pass, the entire estate will pass
to the surviving spouse rather than escheat to the state' 54 -even
if the deceased married the surviving spouse on his deathbed.
Moreover, if there are no other relatives and no surviving spouse,
the property will pass, according to the Act's rules of descent,
to the heirs of the intestate's deceased spouse before it will
escheat (except where the marriage was terminated by di-
vorce) .155 (If there were more than one deceased spouse, it goes
to the heirs of the last one). Only in the absence of all of the
150. Id., committee comment to § 2-102: "This section gives the
surviving spouse a larger share than most existing statutes on de-
scent and distribution. In doing so, it reflects the desires of most mar-
ried persons, who almost always leave all of a moderate estate . . . tot
the surviving spouse .... "
151. Where is the sacredness of dower? Blackstone could not even
locate it as a feudal relic of the Normans, and he found it absent in
Saxon law. He finally concluded that it possibly was "the relic of a
Danish custom." 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 129-130 (1765).
152. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-201 et seq.(1969).
153. Id. at §§ 2-201, 2-202.
154. No. 303, [1969] Ark. Acts § 20.
155. Id.
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foregoing will the property escheat to the state. Even though
the committee set a limit to possible heirship, therefore, it ob-
viously did not favor escheat-a sentiment which is probably
shared by most lawyers and laymen in the state.
IV. A MAJOR DEFECT MARKED FOR CORRECTION
Unfortunately, and certainly unintended by the committee
or the chief drafter, a major defect in Arkansas probate law re-
sulted from the passage of the new Act. As previously dis-
cussed, section nineteen of the Act provides that where there are
no descendants, the entire estate of the intestate deceased passes
to the surviving spouse if they have been continuously married
for three years or longer next preceding the intestate's demise.
If married for a lesser period, the surviving spouse takes one-half
of the heritable estate. Assuming the policy of elevating the
spouse to a more exalted position on the scale of inheritance is
favored, there is nonetheless a problem created by a statute
which does not relate directly to intestacy, but to the situation
in which the decedent dies testate. In this latter situation, al-
though the surviving spouse would probably take under the will
in most instances, an election can of course be made to take
against the will.1 6 The married woman may elect under any
circumstances (assuming she personally takes the necessary
steps within the statutory time period allotted) and the male
survivor may similarly elect when his spouse dies leaving a will
executed before her marriage. Where the surviving spouse does
elect to take against the will, the amount received is "such part
of the property as he or she would have taken had the deceased
spouse died intestate.'' 57
Thus, under the new intestacy provisions, if a deceased dies
leaving descendants, presumably the result is the same as before
-the result of an election to take against the will is to give the
,surviving spouse the amount he or she would have taken as
dower or curtesy. But where the deceased dies without leaving
descendants, the result of exercise of the spouse's option to take
against the will would seem to give the surviving spouse either
all of the estate or one-half of the estate, depending upon the
marital contingency. It was, of course, not the intention of the
drafters or the legislature to reach this result.
It is therefore desirable for a succeeding legislature to do
156. ARK. STAT. ANiN. § 60-501 (Supp. 1967).
157. Id. (Emphasis supplied).
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either one of two things: (1) Pass a bill abandoning dower and
curtesy, amending the Arkansas statute on the spouse's election
and providing for a specific elective share of the surviving spouse
(in which event, it would be highly desirable to include within
the estate from which the elective share is computed certain inter
vivos transfers which might have been made in an attempt to
deprive the surviving spouse of a fair share);158 or (2) simply
amend the existing Arkansas statute previously cited' 59 to pro-
vide that upon the election of the spouse to take against the will,
the spouse will receive such part of the estate as he or she may
take under the Arkansas laws pertaining to dower or curtesy,
homestead, allowances to the widow in the probate and adminis-
tration of estates, and section twenty of Act 303 of 1969.160
At the time this article is being written, it is uncertain
whether a special session of the General Assembly will be called
to meet prior to the effective date of the Act. Hopefully, such a
session will take place and the legislature will correct the defect
discussed above. Since the work of the committee during the
1969-70 Bar Association year will be devoted in large part to a
study of dower and curtesy and suggestions for the replacement
of these provisions with a statutory "share of the surviving
spouse," it will probably be too early to proceed along the lines
158. This is the procedure being followed in the UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE, Fifth Working Draft 2-202 (1969). In fact: "Today in most states
an elective share, supplanting or supplementing dower and curtesy,
has evolved." J. RiTcIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 100 (3rd ed. 1967). Moreover, recent statutes have at-
tempted to prevent the husband from denuding the estate in order to
greatly limit the amount his spouse will receive. Thus, New York
provides that certain inter vivos dispositions will be treated as testa-
mentary dispositions for the purpose of the election by the surviving
spouse. See MCKINNEY'S NEW YORK ESTATES, PowERs AND TRUSTS LAw
§ 5-1.1 (1966).
159. Note 156, supra.
160. This would seem to be in line with ARx. STAT. ANN. § 61-
218 (1947), which provides that widow will elect whether to take
"the land so devised, or the provision so made" in her husband's will "or
whether she will be endowed of the lands of her husband," although to
the extent it was felt that there was any conflict, the newer provision
would seemingly govern. The intent of adding the words, "as dower or
curtesy," of course, would be to limit the effect of the widow's election
to those amounts provided under the various dower statutes (ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 61-201 through 61-206 (1947) ) and to limit the husband's elec-
tion to the amount provided as statutory curtesy (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-
228 (1947)). Homestead, of course, should also be received as in in-
testacy situations, and the widow should be given her statutory probate
allowances (under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501 (Supp. 1967) ). Section
twenty of the new inheritance provisions would permit a spouse to
take as a "last resort heir."
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suggested in the first alternative listed above. It is more likely
that a simple amendment will be added to the statute similar
to that suggested by the second alternative, which will permit
the situation to remain stable until the work of the committee
has been completed. Without question, the situation is a serious
one, since a surviving spouse (particularly a widow) could de-
stroy the effect of the deceased spouse's will by simply electing
to take against it, in situations in which the survivor was not
the sole or major beneficiary, unless the Arkansas Supreme
Court saw fit to follow an unlikely but feasible statutory con-
struction.16 1
V. LOOKING TowARD THE FUTURE
Taken on balance, the advantages of the new Inheritance Act
and the improvements which it effects in the law of intestate
succession in Arkansas outweigh such criticisms as have been
expressed. In eliminating a number of the old feudal appendages,
in doing away with the confusing ancestral estates provisions,
in clearing away many of the conflicts which existed in the pre-
vious law of descent and distribution, the new provisions render
a distinct service to the public and to the legal profession.
If you look down the long road, however, it is obvious that
a number of other reforms in the general law of property and
161. The court could hold, and under the circumstances should
hold, that although ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-501 (Supp. 1967) refers to
the share which would have been received "had the deceased died
intestate," this provision was adopted at a time when the intestate's
share was the amount provided by the dower and curtesy statutes.
Moreover, since (a) the committee and the legislature did not repeal or
alter the dower and curtesy statutes in any way whatsoever, even tak-
ing pains to avoid any effect on these statutes in the case of ancestral
estates (which were otherwise repealed), and (b) the change proposed
by the committee and adopted by the legislature related only to the law
of descent and distribution as opposed to existing statutes on wills, then
.for these reasons it may be concluded that it was not the intent of the
committee or the legislature to disturb the legal effect of taking against
a will as distinguished from the legal effect of passing title to property
where there was no will. Thus, even though the word, "intestate," is
employed in the statute, it would be contrary to the intent of the legis-
lature or the committee to construe the word in the context of this
particular statute to refer to a share by inheritance, and it must be
construed to refer (as it always has and was intended to refer) to the
share the surviving spouse would receive through statutory dower or
curtesy. To construe it otherwise would emasculate the law of wills in
these circumstances and permit results which would be clearly contrary
to public policy. Through this construction, which would constitute a
wise use of judicial statesmanship, the court could arrive at the con-
clusion suggested.
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estates in Arkansas will be required to modernize our statutes.
We are still possessed of all the oddities of the fee tail in Ar-
kansas, which have been exhaustively explored by various and
sundry authors.162 We still have the Rule in Shelley's Case (ex-
cept in the fee tail application of it), and it serves no useful pur-
pose. 6 8 The effect of application of the Rule against Perpetui-
ties in an appropriate situation still frightens lawyers to the
point that estate planning is probably even hampered by it.
(This is not to say that property should not ultimately vest, but
simply that statutory provisions can be devised which relieve
the harsh effects of the Rule by causing or producing an early
vesting when the Rule is offended.)
In the area of intestacy, the problem of more immediate
moment is to tend to dower and curtesy. The modern trend,
which the Uniform Probate Code manifests is to eliminate
these altogether and to provide for the surviving spouse
as a primary and first taker (to some extent or in some amount)
under the statute on intestate succession. This is better than
the treatment accorded the surviving spouse in the Arkansas
Act. In order to prevent a fraud from being practiced on the
surviving spouse by the disposition in large measure of the prop-
erty of the deceased prior to his demise, the UPC and a number
of states follow policies which include various inter vivos dis-
positions of property within the estate on which the surviving
spouse's share is based.16 4  The result is to prevent the result
which some might fear if dower is dispensed with. Problems of
this type, as long as they are recognized, can be worked out.
These new inheritance statutes, then, are a first forward
step down the road to property reform in Arkansas. It is to be
hoped that the Bar Association, through its Committee, will con-
tinue its efforts and will finish the work it has begun.
162. See particularly, Fetters, The Entailed Estate: Ferment for
Reform in Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. Rzv. 275 (1966); and see Wright, supra
note 11, at 254-259.
163. See Wright, supra note 11, at 250-254.
164. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Fifth Working Draft, § 2-202 (1969).
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